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 Abstract:
The current crisis and discussions, in the euro area in particular, show that
sovereign debt crises/defaults are no longer restricted to developing economies.
After crises in many Latin American countries, the literature on quantitative
dynamic macro-models of sovereign default has been advancing. Current debate
should take notice of the ﬁndings from this literature – an extensive overview of
which has been provided in this paper. This paper also discusses the difﬁculties
involved in, but also possibilities of, integrating this type of model in standard
business cycle models (RBC and DSGE models). This is likely to be particularly
helpful when using models to analyse upcoming issues in the euro area, such as a
suitable (sovereign) insolvency law or the assumption of joint liability.
Keywords: Sovereign Debt, Default Risk, Endogenous Borrowing Constraints,
Small Open Economy
JEL code: F34, F41, E21, E32, G10Non-technical summary
The current crisis and discussions, in the euro area in particular, show that
sovereign debt crises/defaults are no longer restricted to developing economies.
After crises in many Latin American countries, the literature on quantitative dy-
namic macro-models of sovereign default has been advancing. Current debate
should take notice of the ﬁndings from this literature – an extensive overview of
which has been provided in this paper.
The literature on quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign de-
fault shows that (1) despite the absence of international insolvency legislation,
sovereigns have an interest in repaying debt owing to reputational damage and
negative output effects; (2) in the event of transitory shocks, debt level is the key
factor determining the probability of default; in the event of trend shocks, the out-
put level also plays a decisive role; (3) the political stability of a country reduces its
probability ofdefault; (4) bailouts orthepossibility ofborrowing frominternational
ﬁnancial institutions such as, for example, the IMF (can) increase the probability
of default; (5) ﬁscal policy acts procyclically if it takes the probability of default
and the impact on interest rates into account; (6) taking private sector debt into ac-
countdoesnotchange the above-mentionedqualitative statementsbut can increase
a government’s propensity to borrow (in relative terms); (7) endogenising negoti-
ations about debt recovery rates tends to increase the interest rates on sovereign
debt but a government’s propensity to borrow can still rise; (8) it can be efﬁcient
forborrowersandcreditorstodelaynegotiationsoverrestructuringsovereigndebt,
although this is heavily dependenton the assumed bargaining game; (9) long-term
bonds usually have a higher rate of interest than short-term ones; (10) contagion
effects owing to risk-averse investors as well as information shocks affecting in-
vestors that impact on the interest rate can even cause fundamentally sound gov-
ernments to default; and (11) the formal method of solving these models also plays
a role in quantitative terms. All of these aspects and the relevant effects that lead to
these conclusions are explained in detail in this paper.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Die gegenwärtige Krise und die Diskussionen insbesondere im Euroraum
zeigen, dass Staatskrisen/-insolvenzen nicht mehr nur ein sich auf entwickelnde
Ökonomien beschränktes Thema sind. Nach den Krisen vieler lateinamerika-
nischer Länder entwickelte sich die Literatur zum Sovereign Default in quantita-
tiven dynamischen Makromodellen. Die aus diesem Literaturstrang gewonnenen
Erkenntnisse– über die in diesem Papier ein ausführlicher Überblick gegebenwird
– sollten auch in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion Beachtung ﬁnden.
In aller Kürze lässt sich aus der Literatur zum Sovereign Default in quantita-
tiven dynamischen Makromodellen ableiten, dass 1.) Staaten trotz Nichtvorhan-
densein eines internationalen Insolvenzrechts wegen Reputationsverlusten und
negativen Outputeffekten ein Interesse an Schuldenrückzahlung haben; 2.) bei
transitorischen Schocks der Schuldenstand, bei Trendschocks auch das Output-
niveau die determinierende Größe zur Bestimmung der Insolvenzwahrschein-
lichkeit ist; 3.) politische Stabilität eines Landes die Insolvenzwahrscheinlichkeit
negativ beeinﬂusst; 4.) Bailouts oder die Möglichkeit, sich bei internationalen Fi-
nanzinstitutionen (z.B. IWF) zu verschulden, die Insolvenzwahrscheinlichkeit er-
höhen (können); 5.) Fiskalpolitik bei Beachtung der Insolvenzwahrscheinlichkeit
und den Auswirkungen auf die Verzinsung prozyklisch agiert; 6.) die Berück-
sichtigung der Verschuldung des Privatsektors die zuvor genannten qualitativen
Aussagen nicht verändern, sich aber die Verschuldungsneigung des Staates (rela-
tiv) erhöhen kann; 7.) die Endogenisierung der Verhandlungen über Rückerstat-
tungsraten tendenziell die Verzinsung der Staatsschuld erhöht, aber trotzdem die
Verschuldungsneigung des Staates steigen kann; 8.) es für Schuldner und Gläu-
biger efﬁzient sein kann, Verhandlungen über Restrukturierung der Staatsschuld
zu verzögern, dies aber stark vom unterstellten Verhandlungsspiel abhängig ist;
9.) langfristige Anleihen in der Regel höher verzinst werden als kurzfristige; 10.)
Ansteckungseffekte aufgrund risikoaverser Investoren sowie den Zinssatz beein-
ﬂussendeInformationsschocksauf Investorenseiteauch zu Insolvenzengrundsätz-
lich solider Staaten führen können; und 11.) die formale Methode zur Lösung
dieserModellequantitativ eineRollespielt. AlldieseAspekteunddieentsprechen-
den Effekte, die zu den Schlussfolgerungen führen, werden in diesem Papier aus-
führlicher erläutert.Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Integrating quantitative models of sovereign default into the general
literature on government debt 3
2 . 1 W h y g o v e r n m e n t s b o r r o w......................... 3
2 . 2 W h y g o v e r n m e n t s s e r v i c e t h e i r d e b t................... 4
2 . 3 P r o b l e m s i n t h e e v e n t o f s o v e r e i g n d e f a u l t ................ 6
3 Base model of sovereign default 7
3 . 1 T h e f o u n d a t i o n s............................... 7
3 . 2 A b a s e m o d e l :S e t u p a n d s o l u t i o n m e t h o d................ 8
4 Developments in quantitative models of sovereign default 15
4 . 1 T h e b a s e m o d e l s............................... 1 5
4 . 2 R i s k a v e r s i o n a n d c o n t a g i o n........................ 1 8
4 . 3 M o r e c o m p l e x ﬁ s c a l p o l i c i e s........................ 2 0
4 . 4 N e g o t i a t i n g t o r e g a i n c a p i t a l m a r k e t a c c e s s ............... 2 1
4 . 5 D e b t m a t u r i t y a n d d e b t d i l u t i o n ..................... 2 5
4 . 6 C h o o s i n g t h e d e b t c o m p o s i t i o n a n d w h e r e t o b o r r o w ......... 2 7
5 Integration of the approaches into a RBC model 29
6 Conclusions 31List of Tables
1 P a r a m e t e r v a l u e s .............................. 1 0
2 S i m u l a t i o n r e s u l t s.............................. 1 4
List of Figures
1 B o n d p r i c e s c h e d u l e ............................ 1 3
2 V a l u e f u n c t i o n................................ 1 3
3 D y n a m i c s o f G D P a n d s p r e a d....................... 1 5Recent Developments in Quantitative Models of Sovereign
Default1
1 Introduction
The current crisis has reawakenedthe (public) interest in sovereign defaults in gen-
eral – but also in stabilisation measures aimed at preventing the occurrence of such
events in particular. Debate in the euro area shows that such issues are no longer
restricted to developing countries only but are also becoming more relevant for
developed economies. Topics such as contagion, suitable insolvency legislation or
a workable – at least partial – assumption of joint liability, for example as part of
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Financial Stability Facil-
ity (EFSF) or even Eurobonds, have made it on to the agenda (see Arghyrou and
Kontonikas, 2011). Business cycle models (ie RBC or DSGE models) are generally a
suitable theory-based analysis tool for evaluating/simulating various (ﬁscal) poli-
cies. Many major (international) institutions are also currently using them in this
way to analyse a wide range of crisis-related issues.2 However – owing to under-
standable technical reasons – they are rather tacit when it comes to issues related
to sovereign defaults.
This paper provides an overview of recent developments in the literature on
quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign default and a brief explanation of
how this model class could be more closely integrated into standard RBC/DSGE
models. Integrating sovereign default into such economic models is likely to prove
quitehelpfulforamicro-baseddiscussionoftheissuesmentionedabove. However,
the ﬁndings from quantitative models of sovereign default gained to date should
also be considered in the current debate. To the author’s knowledge, no extensive
overview ofthis literature yetexists. The main sectionofthis paper has deliberately
been written intuitively to make the analysis of this model class accessible to non-
theoreticians, too. A simple base model has been included, however.
The literature on quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign default
primarily evolved in the wake of government crises in many Latin American coun-
tries over the last two decades. In the literature, a sovereign’s decision about
1Author: Nikolai Stähler, Deutsche Bundesbank, email: nikolai.staehler@bundesbank.de. I would
like to thank Gerrit Köster, Michael Krause, Maria Longson, Bernhard Manzke, Christoph Moser,
Christoph Priesmeier and Karsten Wendorff for their helpful comments. The opinions expressed
in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions of the Bundesbank or its staff. Any remaining
errors are the author’s alone.
2The following is a non-exhaustive list of ﬁscal policy issues that can be cited as examples: the ef-
fectiveness of ﬁscal stimulus programmes (see inter alia Almeida et al, 2010; Coenen et al, 2010a,
2010b; Hebous, 2010), a cost-beneﬁt analysis of various consolidation measures (see inter alia
Freedman, 2009; Stähler and Thomas, 2011) or an evaluation of structural changes to tax legisla-
tion (see inter alia Coenen et al, 2008).
1whether to service its debt or default is endogenised. In a way, this means an analy-
sis of the aspects of being “willing to repay debts” rather than those of being “able
to repay debts”. However, this should not be seen as a limitation. Many sovereign
defaults were or are brought about by a loss of public support for measures to re-
structure the government budget that would probably enable debts to be repaid.
Even in the current European context, this point is likely to be important.
The quantitative models of sovereign debt that are primarily examined in
this paper endogenisethe sovereign’s default decision by comparing present value
functions of whether to meet its payment obligations. Governments borrow from
abroad. International investors ﬁx interest rates based on their expectations of the
government’s repayment behaviour. The models are able to explain interest rate
developments and sovereign default using a country’s output ﬂuctuations. How-
ever, in the majority of cases, the output process is assumed to be exogenous.
Repercussions of interest rate developments on the productivity of the country in
question are usually not shown endogenously. Another branch of the literature
that endogenises the output process in the sense of RBC models but assumes inter-
est rate developments to be exogenous shows that there is a negative correlation
between the two quantities.3 However, combining these two approaches may be a
suitable way of addressing the shortcoming in each individual branch of the liter-
ature (see also Mendoza and Yue, 2010). We will revisit this point at the end of the
paper once we have integrated the models into the general literature on sovereign
defaults and summarised the present ﬁndings gained from the literature.
In brief, the literature on quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign
default shows that (1) despite the absence of international insolvency legislation,
sovereigns have an interest in repaying debt owing to reputational damage and
negative output effects; (2) in the event of transitory shocks, debt level is the key
factor determining the probability of default; in the event of trend shocks, the out-
put level also plays a decisive role; (3) the political stability of a country reduces its
probability ofdefault; (4) bailouts orthepossibility ofborrowing frominternational
ﬁnancial institutions such as, for example, the IMF (can) increase the probability
of default; (5) ﬁscal policy acts procyclically if it takes the probability of default
and the impact on interest rates into account; (6) taking private sector debt into ac-
countdoesnotchange the above-mentionedqualitative statementsbut can increase
a government’s propensity to borrow (in relative terms); (7) endogenising negoti-
ations about debt recovery rates tends to increase the interest rates on sovereign
debt but a government’s propensity to borrow can still rise; (8) it can be efﬁcient
forborrowersandcreditorstodelaynegotiationsoverrestructuringsovereigndebt,
3This literature and the ﬁndings thereof are examined in depth in Mendoza (2006, 2010) and are
therefore not described in detail in this paper.
2although this is heavily dependenton the assumed bargaining game; (9) long-term
bonds usually have a higher rate of interest than short-term ones; (10) contagion
effects owing to risk-averse investors as well as information shocks affecting in-
vestors that impact on the interest rate can even cause fundamentally sound gov-
ernments to default; and (11) the formal method of solving these models also plays
a role in quantitative terms. All of these aspects and the relevant effects that lead to
these conclusions are explained in detail below.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 integrates the model
class we focus on here in the general literature on government debt. Section 3
presents the underlying articles that led to the development of newer quantitative
models of sovereign default. Furthermore, it contains a stylised (and simpliﬁed)
base model and describes the solution method. Section 4 describes recent devel-
opments in this literature. Section 5 outlines the approaches to improving the in-
tegration of this literature with RBC models. A summary can be found in Section
6.
2 Integrating quantitative models of sovereign default
into the general literature on government debt
In order to be able to improve the understanding of the model class discussed be-
low, it appears appropriate to ﬁrst of all integrate it into the literature on govern-
ment debt. It is particularly important to examine why governments borrow, what
motivates them to repay their debt and which problems arise should they default.
2.1 Why governments borrow
In the political economy there is, in principle, little doubt that governments have
a propensity to borrow (for more details, see Eslava, 2010). This is triggered by a
certain degree of ﬁscal illusion or by “common pool” problems. In both cases there
are clear points in favour of debt-ﬁnanced spending for a certain group, where the
ﬁnancing costs are distributed over a larger base (the common pool) or put off until
a future date (see, for example, von Hagen, 1992; and Velasco, 2000). Furthermore,
a government uses debt ﬁnancing inter alia to increase its chance of being reelected
or – if it has reason to believe it will be voted out of ofﬁce – to limit the new govern-
ment’s discretionary leeway (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). In conventional politico-
economic (usually one-country) models, long-term equilibrium is established by
corresponding changes on the capital market (for instance, risk premiums and a
corresponding decline in private investment) and in ﬁscal policy (in some cases,
rule-bound), which thus bring spending into line with potential revenue (see Woo,
32005; or Stähler, 2009). The exclusion of Ponzi games generally results in a mecha-
nism that prevents bankruptcy.
The (New) Keynesian theory can (at least, if there is a prolonged sequence
of unfavourable shocks) also be used to justify government borrowing as counter-
cyclical ﬁscal policy – in particular when aided by automatic stabilisers – smoothes
the consumption path, which is usually a welcome development from a welfare
perspective (see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007). However, in this
theory, in periods of upswing debt should be repaid and replaced by a formation
of assets, as is shown, for example, by Fatás and Mihov (2002), Galí and Perotti
(2003) and Wyplosz (2006).
Theliterature discussedbelow is neverthelessbasedon this argumentof gov-
ernmentdebt. In contrast to the literature mentioned above, quantitative models of
sovereign default rationalise the reason why sovereigns default in such an environ-
ment – that is if, in terms of (discounted)welfare, the ﬁnancing costs of government
debt are higher than the ﬁnes for a defaulting sovereign. Thus these models exam-
ine the “willingness” rather than the “ability” to repay debts. It should be noted
in this context that the model class discussed below is limited to real foreign debt.
Aspectsof domestic debt and hence the potential monetisation of government debt
are not examined.4
2.2 Why governments service their debt
In contrast to insolvencies in the private sector, it is impossible – or at least greatly
difﬁcult – to force independentsovereigns to repay outstanding debts, especially to
foreign creditors. According to politico-economic arguments, sovereigns are nev-
ertheless keen to repay debts if no distinction can be drawn between domestic and
foreign creditors and if the incumbent government can maximise the utility for do-
mestic households or if it is concerned that there may be domestic unrest and/or it
may be voted out of ofﬁce (see Broner et al, 2006; or Bornsztein and Panizza, 2009).
However, the models discussed below focus on foreign debt, thus leaving almost
no place for these arguments.
The potential (partial) exclusion from the capital market as an important in-
centive torepay debtswas identiﬁedat an early stagein theliterature. It is assumed
that foreign debt presents an opportunity for governments to insure households
against ﬂuctuations in output (and the resulting ﬂuctuations in utility or produc-
tion). Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) assume that debtor countries are excluded from
the capital market if they do not service their debt. This is sufﬁcient grounds to
4For information on these aspects, see the discussions in Sargent and Wallace (1981), Kocherlakota
and Phelan (1999), Leeper and Yun (2006), and McCallum and Nelson (2006).
4always service outstanding debt – at least up to a certain limit. This paper is dis-
cussed in greater detail in Section 3.1. Even if the extreme assumption of perma-
nent exclusion and approval of other insurance options for sovereigns is relaxed,
situations may arise in which a (partial) exclusion from the capital market repre-
sents a serious threat (see, for example, Kletzer and Wright, 2000; or Wright, 2002).
However, from an empirical perspective, this threat does not appear to be the main
incentive to service debts as any exclusion from the capital market (in particular,
in the recent past) is of a rather limited duration and cyclical ﬂuctuations on credit
markets themselves seem to have a much larger impact on individual sovereigns’
access to the capital market (see Sandleris et al, 2004; and Richmond and Dias,
2009). The increased price of borrowing options following a loss of reputation also
seems to be rather short lived as corresponding risk premiums no longer show up
in the statistics three years later (see Borensztein and Panizza, 2009).5
It seems plausible that a country’s refusal to repay its debts could have (neg-
ative growth) consequences within that country, too. For example, domestic and
foreign economic agents may see sovereign default as a sign of a country’s (struc-
tural) situation being worse than anticipated, which could result in a correction of
expectations about future ﬁscal policy, capital outﬂows, lower investment and po-
tential banking crises (see, for example, Sandleris, 2008; Catão and Kapur, 2006; as
well as Catão et al, 2007). For instance, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) and
Borensztein and Panizza (2009) ﬁnd relatively clear evidence of a statistical link
between sovereign default and banking crises. Sturzenegger (2004), de Paoli et al
(2006) and Panizza et al (2009) ﬁnd a negative correlation between bankruptcy and
growth, while Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2006) cannot conﬁrm such a ﬁnding. The
causality here does not appear to be one hundred percent clear (for a discussion,
see Panizza et al, 2009).
In summary it can be said that, from an empirical perspective, a sovereign’s
incentives to repay its debt are primarily explained by the domestic cost of
sovereign default, while uncertainty about the form and the extent of debt restruc-
turing can intensify the effects mentioned above (Panizza et al, 2009). The literature
discussedbelow assumes a mix of domestic unrestand a temporaryexclusion from
5If capital market effects play only a limited role in debt repayment, the debtor country may fear
the imposition of sanctions by the creditor countries. These include political – or even military
– pressure, imminent or actual seizure of assets as well as constraints on trade relations. While
military actions were in fact carried out in the past, these do not seem likely today – at least in
developed economies. Likewise, the threat of (sovereign) assets being seized is not expected –
at least directly – to be a great incentive to repay debts (for a discussion of these aspects, see
Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005; and Tomz, 2007). However, a negative impact on trading has
actually been identiﬁed – albeit not always for long periods of time (see Rose, 2005; Lanau, 2008;
and Borenszteinand Panizza, 2010). Whether constraints ontrade relationshipspersearea reason
to repaydebts remains to be seen. Yet a debtor country’s export-orientedcompanies are especially
affected, a fact which could also be included in the domestic effects discussed below.
5the capital market following sovereign default.
2.3 Problems in the event of sovereign default
The fact that there are no legal provisions to force a country to repay outstanding
governmentdebtalsomeansthattherearenoprovisionsonwhattodoshouldsuch
a situation actually arise. In this case, an unequal distribution of rights between
creditors and debtors can result in considerable inefﬁciencies. For the most part,
current literature reducesthis issueto collective action problems which can be sum-
marised into three categories (for what follows, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer,
2007; Bernhardand Kellermann, 2008; Berensmannand Herzberg, 2009; Rogoffand
Zettelmeyer, 2002; and Roubini, 2002 for more details).
The ﬁrst category is “holding out” for original claims (free-rider effects). It
is very difﬁcult to establish an evolved restructuring procedure that could be ad-
vantageous for a majority of creditors if a minority of creditors can circumvent the
procedure and may thus not have to participate in the burden of restructuring. In-
stead the minority counts on full repayment of the claims once restructuring has
been completed. This problem is intensiﬁed in situations where there is no perfect
information and thus uncertainty about the behaviour of other creditors.
The second category is “rush to the exit”. As soon as there is the risk of a
debt crisis in a debtor country (even in the case of a short-term reconcilable liquid-
ity crisis), there is a tendency for creditors to engage in disorderly and immediate
(“panic”) sales or redemptions of their claims. This can put a stop to new bond
issues and inﬂate risk premiums and interest rates. Ultimately, it may even lead to
a self-fulﬁlling liquidity and debt crisis.
Thethirdcategoryis“rushtothecourthouse”. Ifa debtorofferstorestructure
the debt burden, the creditor can refuse and instead try to sue to enforce its claims.
The debt is then repaid from any assets that the debtor still has. This can result
in a collective action problem if the debtor’s assets are limited. The ﬁrst creditor,
whoselegalclaim is metin full, thenleaves asmaller insolvency estateforany other
remaining creditors. As soon as there is an indication of a debtor’s insolvency, the
courts may be stormed with every creditor insisting on re-payment in full.
Authors such as Roubini (2002) or Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) have iden-
tiﬁed another key problem area for sovereign default on the part of the debtor,
namely a potential “rush to default”. This could be caused by a debtor country’s
potential immunity, in particular in the case of claims on physical assets by credi-
tors. If costs of default for a debtor country are low from the start, then the moral
hazard on the part of the debtor increases the incentive to de-fault opportunisti-
cally. Merely observing a "rush to default" in a debtor country often automatically
6leads to higher opportunity costs in the form of rising interest rates. Berensmann
and Herzberg (2009), Häseler (2009) and Panizza et al (2009), to name but a few,
describe and compare various existing proposals – culminating in an international
insolvency law for states– to solve theseproblems. Todate, with oneexception, the
literature outlined below refrains from analysing such rules. The author believes
that there is great potential for extending the literature on this subject.
3 Base model of sovereign default
The literature on quantitative models of sovereign default discussed below analy-
ses default in a micro-based model following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) as well as
Grossman and van Huyck (1988). The ﬁrst part of this section outlines thesetwo ar-
ticles. In the second part we present a stylised quantitative (base) model and give
a brief overview of the solution method used. The latter seems helpful to better
understand the ﬁndings of the literature described in Section 4.
3.1 The foundations
Theanalysis by EatonandGersovitz(1981) andbyGrossman and van Huyck(1988)
can, in principle, be seen as a theoretical basis for the dynamic (stochastic) macro
models that endeavour to portray government crises using numerical solutions.
Sovereigns cannot be forced to repay outstanding government debt and there is
no international insolvency law governing debt restructuring. Sovereign default is
thus interpreted as a contingent claim. Both Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Gross-
man and van Huyck (1988) formalise the reasons why sovereigns usually choose to
service their debt from a theoretical point of view. The models assume a sovereign
that maximises households’ intertemporal utility resulting from (the path of) con-
sumption. Owing to budget constraints, the government has to ﬁnance public
spending and interest on outstanding government debt with revenue and, possi-
bly, borrowing (debt roll-over). Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) assume that debtor
countries which default once are permanently excluded from the capital markets
and thus cannot roll over debt in the future. As, due to its utility function, house-
holds have a preference for smoothing future consumption, this provides a strong
incentive to service debts. By not servicing present government debts, the poten-
tial for current consumptioncan be increased. However, following a default, future
consumption can no longer be “brought forward” and the effects of income ﬂuctu-
ations on consumption can no longer be smoothed.
When deciding whether to default, the sovereign compares the present value
of the utility with and without the option of smoothing consumption. If the latter
7is higher, the outstanding debt is no longer serviced. Due to this (theoretical) pos-
sibility of lenders being left holding their claims, these lenders will (endogenously)
set an upper credit ceiling depending on how high they expect the government’s
utility loss resulting from an exclusion from the credit market to be. The model’s
structure implies that debts are serviced in a state of equilibrium. Grossman and
Huyck (1988) relax the assumption of a permanent exclusion from the capital mar-
kets and assume that the exclusion is only temporary which, as we explained in
Section 2.2, is a more realistic scenario. They show that a sovereign may default
in a state of equilibrium. Because in this model lenders form expectations about
the trustworthinessof a sovereign and also differentiate between excusable default
and unjustiﬁable repudiation, the sovereign in question is keen to maintain a good
reputation and to restrict its non-servicing of debts to “bad times” only. Lenders
consider a sovereign to be trustworthy if it borrows only what it can pay back in
“normal times” (the debt level can be calculated in the model). If a sovereign still
defaults in normal or even in good times, then it loses its trustworthy reputation
and the costs of default rise relatively sharply or lenders are no longer willing to
provide loans. This also means that in this model (1) defaults in a state of equilib-
rium occur only in “bad times” and (2) debt is not built up in excess of that which
can be paid back in normal times. Furthermore, default is usually only partial.
From a lender’s perspective, only the worst state of the world (ie the lowest level
of productivity possible in the model) can produce total default.
3.2 A base model: Setup and solution method
Model setup and equilibrium
The literature generally considers a small open economy that receives a stochastic
stream of income, y. The sovereign trades bonds, d, with risk neutral competitive
foreign investors at price q(d,y), but debt contracts are not enforceable. Every pe-
riod, the sovereign is, therefore, in one of two states: default or non-default, D and







where D is the binary choice to default (D = 1) or not (D = 0), output y follows a
stochastic process explained below and d denotes the asset stock of the sovereign.
Hence, for an indebted country it holds that d < 0. The sovereign maximises the
economy’s utility by choosing whether to default or not. Default, D = 1 is chosen
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is the present value function of being in the non-default state. A prime indicates
(expected) next period’s values of the corresponding variable. u(c)=c1−σ
1−σ,w i t h
σ > 0, is a CRRA per-period utility function of consumption, c, β is the discount
factorandθ theexogenouslydeterminedprobability ofre-entrytothecreditmarket
when in the default state.
In equation (2), it is assumed that c = ydef, ie householdsconsume all income
ydef available in default states, with
ydef =

y if y < ¯ y
ˆ y = ψ · ¯ y if y > ¯ y
,
where ψ ∈ (0,1) are output costs of default and ¯ y = E{y} is expected output.
This implies that, in autarky (ie when the country is excluded from the capital mar-
ket), the output process is truncated because it is assumed that default entails some
direct output cost. The main motivation for doing this is to bring the default prob-
ability implied by the model in line with the data (see Arellano, 2008, and section
2 . 2f o rad i s c u s s i o n ) .
In equation (3), ie in the non-default state, c = y − q(d ,y)d  + d.T h e
sovereign can borrow from international investors by selling one-period bonds d 
at price q(d ,y), which is determined below, and promises to repay this by giving
up one unit of consumption in the next period. Hence, d is the repayment due to
previous borrowing (remember that d < 0 for indebted countries). Note that the
lower is the price q(d ,y), the higher is the interest on debt.
Creditors are generally assumed to be risk-neutral. Whenever they lend
to the sovereign in the current period, they buy bonds d  at price q(d ,y) from
the government. Next period period, the creditors may receive the face value






is the default probability. Therefore, with this probability,
the creditorsget nothing, while, with probability 1−δ(d ,y), theyget the face value
d . Assuming a risk-free interest rate r, free market entry and zero-proﬁt on the





We see that it depends on the default probability, δ(d ,y), the current output state
y, current asset holding in the economy d as well as the amount of new bonds d 
9sold by the government.
These equations are sufﬁcient to characterize a simple default model. The
recursive equilibrium of this economy is characterized by a set of value functions
{V(d,y),VD(y), VN(d,y)}, a set of policy functions for households’ consumption
c(d,y) as well as policy functions for the government’s default decision D and op-
timal asset holdings d  such that
a. Taking as given the government policies, households’ consumption c(d,y)
satisﬁes the budget constraints (ie c = ydef in autarky and c = y−q(d ,y)d  +
d otherwise).
b. Taking as given the bond price function q(d y), the governments policy func-
tions d  (ie the desired amount of new borrowing per period) and default sets
D satisfy the government’s optimisation problem.
c. Bond prices q(d y) reﬂect the government’s default probabilities and are
consistent with the creditors’ expected zero proﬁt condition.
Numerical solution
The model is then solved numerically. Parameters are generally based on existing
literature or calibrated to match speciﬁc facts. The output process is usually esti-
mated according to the economy to be matched. Here, we assume that it is given
by y = exp(z),w h e r ezt = ρzt−1 +  t and  t ∼ N(0,σ2
z) . Our parameter choices
(and the corresponding sources) are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values
What Symbol Value Source
Risk aversion σ 2.000 Arellano (2008)
Discount factor β 0.953 Arellano (2008)
Risk-free interest rate r 0.017 Arellano (2008)
Re-entry probability θ 0.252 Cuadra and Sapriza (2008)
Default output costs ψ 0.950 Arellano (2008)
Output shock ρ 0.850 Cuadra and Sapriza (2008)
σ2
z 0.025 Cuadra and Sapriza (2008)
Note: Values are taken from the literature without performing an own empirical analysis because the
presented model is meant as an illustrative example and not to replicate actual/speciﬁc data.
Because the sovereign uses present value functions to calculate the utility of
not-servicing or servicing its debt (which are generally utility functions with non-
linear equations) and one has to calculate the default probability endogenously,the
solution of this maximisation problem also has to use non-linear techniques. The
10standard solution method used is the discrete space technique. It works as follows.
Afterhaving deﬁned the functional forms as well as theparameters, we needto de-
ﬁne a state space for the sovereign’s assets/debtwith a lower and an upper bound.
We deﬁne these bounds to be d = −0.25 and ¯ d = 0.05. A certain number of evenly
spaced grid pointsare thentaken from this space to be usedas a proxy for all possi-
ble debt levels. As described in the literature overview below, it can be shown that
this number of grid points has to be relatively large to avoid incorrect interest rate
movements in the model.
In addition, a discrete state space has to be generated for output. We also
need a matrix for transitional probabilities. For this purpose, it is usually assumed
– as we did, too – that output follows an autoregressive process and a shock can
move this level up or down. This shock, originating from a certain distribution
function, can be converted to an n-state Markov chain using a quadrature-based
method(seeTauchenandHussey,1991). ThisMarkovchain (withdimensionn×n)
can be interpreted as a “matrix of transitional probabilities”. At this juncture it should
be noted again that if a sovereign defaults, output costs occur which lower the
level described here further. For the illustrative example model here, we assume
22 output states and 200 asset states. Once these preparations have been made, the
numerical solution of the model can begin.
In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium allocations and the bond price schedule for
debt, the following algorithm is generally used:
1. Discretise the state space as described above.
2. Start with a guess for the bond price schedule such that q0(d,y)=1/(1 + r)
for all d and y.
3. Use q0(d,y) to solve the sovereign’s problem recursively using value function
iteration by taking the assumed price schedule for bonds as given and obtain
the optimal policy functions for consumption c(d,y), asset holdings d (d,y)
and default sets D.
4. Given these policy functions, compute the probability of default δ(d ,y).
5. Update the price of bonds using equation (4).
6. Use the updated price of the bond q1(d,y) to repeat steps 2 to 5 until the
convergence criterion, max{q0(d,y)−q1(d,y)} < Δ,w h e r eΔ is a (very) small
number, is met.
It is obvious that this solution method can be rather time-consuming and
computationally intensive even in small models. Given 22 output and 200 asset
11states, there are already 4,400 states/combinations for which the solution just
described has to solve the model. Hence, models with many state spaces as well as
larger models may stretch even modern computers to their limits. We also see that
linear-approximative solutions, which are commonly used in larger (ultimately
linearised) DSGE models, cannot be applied here. Linearisation means that they
are not precise enough to calculate risk premiums effectively. Therefore, the main
reasons why this idea has not yet been included in larger models are likely to be
the inaccuracy of linear solution methods as well as, in many cases, the complexity
of many of the DSGE models used.6 As will be seen at the end of this paper,
this should not stand in the way of continuing to develop the literature described
below as it has great potential to provide answers to future questions.
Results
Merely all papers on this issue present the resulting bond price schedule as a func-
tion of assets for two values of the productivity shock (high and low), which we
also do in Figure 1.
As the ﬁgure shows, the bond price is an increasing function of foreign as-
sets, which can be explained as follows. It is evident from the model description
that the utility for the representative household increases as consumption rises. If
the sovereign repays debt, the utility for the representative household falls with
outstanding government debt ceteris paribus. If the sovereign decides against re-
paying outstanding debt, then the utility for the representative household in that
period increases. Hence, if investors were then to buy more sovereign bonds (with-
out consideringthe default risk), this would be an optimal time for the government
to default in any period (see also Grossman and van Huyck, 1988). Of course, this
does not happen. Thus it is assumed that a sovereign default entails costs for the
government: (1.) Access to the capital markets is temporarily lost, meaning that
the possibility of consumption smoothing is limited. In addition, it is assumed
that if a sovereign defaults there will (2.) also be unrest within the country which
would lower productivity and therefore income. Just how long the government is
6At this juncture it appears appropriate to note that there are now alternative approaches to the
endogenisation of risk premiums in larger dynamic macro models. However, these are less con-
cerned with the sovereign’s decision that it is not willing to repay debt but assume that creditors
believe that governments are no longer able to repay debt as of a certain debt ratio. As of this debt
level, households are no longer willing to purchase government debt. The key word here is ﬁscal
limits. Basically in this branch of the literature it is assumed that the sovereign (credibly) deﬁnes
a certain path of primary surpluses which then calculates the default probability to ensure that
the transversality condition continues to hold. The default probability then generally determines
how much of the outstanding government debt is repaid and can also be interpreted as an “en-
dogenous haircut”. A ﬁscal rule still ensures that long-term equilibrium is guaranteed, but now
also taking the default probability into consideration. As this model class is not the main focus of
the present paper, see Bi et al (2010) or Juessen et al (2010) for more details.
12Figure 1: Bond price schedule

























Figure 2: Value function





























excluded from the international capital markets is shown by an exogenous proba-
bility of regaining access.
The sovereign therefore has to make the following decision. If it pays down
the debt, it lowers households’ utility today but can continue to borrow and, in
general, can expect higher output. If it chooses not to pay, it has to cope with pro-
ductivity losses and a delay in smoothing consumption owing to exclusion from
the capital market. The sovereign compares the expected present value of these
two options in that period and decides whether to default. Figure 2 shows the
value of the option to default or repay as a function of assets-to-GDP for a high and
a low productivity level. We observe that, for a given output realisation, default is
chosen for all levels of assets below a certain threshold, ie when the value function
become horizontal. In this case, the autarky is better than staying in the contract
because ﬁnancing costs become too high. When setting prices for bonds, interna-
tional investors take the sovereign’s decision into consideration. The more likely
they believe the sovereign is to default on its debt, the less they are prepared to pay
for a bond. Hence, as is shown, the price of bonds falls (ie the interest payments on
government debt rise) the larger the outstanding government debt and the lower
the (expected) productivity of the country in question. In extreme cases, the price
13may fall to zero (and interest payments thus rise inﬁnitely). This would mean that
no-one wants to buy sovereign bonds of the country in question.
Furthermore,wecan presentsomesimulation resultsand thestatistical prop-
erties of the model. In Table 2, we show the business cycle moments of selected
macroeconomic variables for the simulated economy. These statistics are average
values over 1000 simulations of 100 realizations each, drawn from a stationary dis-
tribution. The simulated series are logged and ﬁltered. Figure 3 shows how the
interest rate spread increases as output contracts in the economy.
Table 2: Simulation results
Argentinean data Arellano (2008) Model results
Mean bond spread 10.25 3.58 3.65
Default probability 3.00 3.00 3.55
Mean debt-to-GDP ratio 48.79 5.95 4.70
Correlation (Spread-GDP) -0.88 -0.29 -0.20
Correlation (Trade balance-GDP) -0.64 -0.25 -0.32
Correlation (Consumption-GDP) 0.98 0.97 0.88
Note: The table shows selected simulated moments of the models and compares them to the “base
model” of Arellano (2008) as well as Argentinean data. The latter is obtained from Cuadra and
Sapriza (2008).
We see that this model class is able to match several stylised facts that can be
observed in the data (at least in developing countries). These facts include, among
others, that incentives to default are higher for more indebted countries and de-
fault risk and interest rate spreads move countercyclical (see Figures 1, 2 and 3).
It can also be seen that private consumption is positively correlated with output,
while the trade balance is negatively correlated (see Table 2). However, we also
observe some drawbacks of this model class. For example, they have difﬁculties
replicating the magnitude of the mean bond spreads and fare quite bad in replicat-
ing realistically high debt-to-GDP ratios. In order to show that this is not a feature
of the simple model at hand, we also present the results of Arellano (2008) to com-
pare our model results with hers. The data for Argentina is taken from Cuadra
and Sapriza (2008). Despite those drawbacks, this class of models is, nevertheless,
able to qualitatively ﬁt the data as well as highlight some interesting aspects and
mechanisms.
In the next section, we will describe recent developments in the literature of
this model class in more detail. We will primarily focus on the qualitative ﬁndings
of the literature and point out where there may be options for extensions.
14Figure 3: Dynamics of GDP and spread











































Notes: GDP is shown in percentage deviations from its trend. The spread is deﬁned as
s = 1/q(d ,y) − 1 − r.
4 Developments in quantitative models of sovereign
default
4.1 The base models
To the author’s knowledge, Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) were the ﬁrst to integrate
the purely theoretical studies on sovereign default into a quantitative model.7 In
their model, it can be seen that, in addition to exclusion from the capital markets,
following a sovereign default in the country in question further (negative) output
effects themselves are a necessary condition for generating equilibria that contain
both repayment and default situations at debt ratios that are seen as being more re-
alistic (yet constant). The model presented in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) contains a
“good” and a “bad” sovereign. A “good” sovereign is one that attributes relatively
high importance to future consumption (and discounts it at the same rate as house-
holds), whereas a “bad” sovereign is one that attributes a great deal of importance
to current consumption and in the model always decides not to service its debt. Af-
ter a default, lenders cannot verify which category the sovereign falls into and have
to form expectations as to whether the sovereign is good or bad when purchasing
7Of course these issues were also pursued non-quantitatively (see, for example, Bulow and Rogoff,
1989, as well as Cole et al, 1995, and Cole and Kehoe, 1998, 2000 who also include the possibility
of sunspot equilibria). However, as this paper focuses on newer (quantitative) models, we do not
discuss this point in detail.
15and pricing new government bonds. Based on this assumption, the model is able
to explain an empirical observation (at least as far as Latin American countries are
concerned) as to why sovereigns do not default until they have experienced a se-
ries of negative shocks (ie not until after a sharp recession). A good sovereign uses
a delay of this kind to signal its “goodness” and thus to obtain better conditions
on the capital markets in the future. In other words, the decision to default is not
made until it is clear that there is no alternative (the authors call this phenomenon
“muddling-through equilibrium”). To use Grossman and Huyck’s (1988) terminol-
ogy, one would speak of a (very) excusable default. Aided by numerical analysis,
the authors also demonstrate that welfare is higher in all equilibria in which there
is no default in any productivity state (measured as consumption equivalents as in
Lucas, 1987).8
Alfaro and Kanczuk’s (2005) model is relatively simple in the sense that it
envisages only three productivity states, that the transitional matrix for thesestates
is stipulated exogenously (ie it is not based on a “full stochastic” distribution func-
tion) and that the (equilibrium) debt level is assumed to be exogenous and con-
stant (the sovereign thus decides only whether to pay interest or not). By contrast,
Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) endogenise government debt and assume that output
follows a stochastic, normally distributed process. Furthermore, they assume that
the economy under consideration has two different types of household, each of
which derives utility from different (public) goods. These two types of household
are represented by two different political parties (for instance, left-wing or conser-
vative governments) which – when in ofﬁce – give preferential treatment to their
own supporters. Unlike in the literature discussed in Section 2.1, both parties are
not in power at the same time. One party governs but is at risk of being replaced
by the opposition. Should this happen, the incumbent party becomes the opposi-
tion and the other party takes ofﬁce. The transition probability is set exogenously
and thus closely corresponds to Alfaro and Kanczuk’s (2005) probability of being a
goodor bad sovereign. As the political parties have different preferencesregarding
the structure of public goods and as they know that this composition will change
as soon as the other party takes ofﬁce, the incentive for the incumbent party to give
preferential treatment to its supporters and to ﬁnance this by borrowing increases.
From the incumbent government’s perspective, the costs of sovereign default fall
in relative terms as it is fairly certain that they will have to be borne by the other
party (one can speak of a quasi-ﬁnite time horizon). This model structure improves
the models’ quantitative ﬁt with the data and explains the interaction between po-
8Here, consumption equivalents as deﬁned by Lucas (1987) would be interpreted as the percentage
of steady-state consumption that households are prepared to surrender to enter a non-default
equilibrium.
16litical risk, government debt and interest rate spreads. Hatchondo et al (2009), who
differentiate between patient and impatient governments but not between public
goods themselves, and D’Erasmo (2010), who additionally integrates debt renego-
tiation explicitly, come to similar conclusions. It can be demonstrated empirically,
for example by Moser(2007), that political risk can actually impact onbond spreads
and default probabilities.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) use a similar model, however without distin-
guishing between types of sovereign, to isolate transitory shocks from shocks to
trend growth. They show that if transitory shocks exist, it is primarily the debt
level which determines whether a sovereign defaults, and that, in model simula-
tions, output shocks at a given (relatively low original) debt level result in only a
very low default rate. As outlined above, sovereigns decide to default if the dis-
counted utility of the capital market autarky (ie following partial exclusion from
the capital markets) is larger than the discounted utility of servicing debts. The
difference between these two discounted utilities is comparatively constant in the
case of transitoryshocks (as such a shock has roughly the same effect on both utility
functions), making the debtlevel thedriving factor. However,thepresenceof trend
shocks causes a greater response by the values of both discounted utilities as well
as the difference between them so that, in this scenario, shocks have a much larger
impact. This implies that, given the same initial level of debt, the insolvency rate
is affected perceptibly more after a trend shock than compared to transitory one. A
positive trend shock means that income rises today but rises even further tomor-
row. By making it easier to access government debt, tomorrow’s consumption can
be brought forward to the present and the discounted utility of servicing debt thus
rises at a relatively faster pace than in capital market autarky. The opposite is true
inthecaseofnegativetrendshocks. Henceatrendshockhasamuch greaterimpact
on the propensity to default than a transitory shock. From this we can derive that
(regular) economic ﬂuctuations should have virtually no impact on a sovereign’s
default decision, whereas (long-term) growth prospects are quite relevant.
An interesting aspect in this analysis is the ﬁnding that bail-outs increase the
probability of default signiﬁcantly. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) model bailouts as
a transfer from a (unmodelled) third party to the country in question under the as-
sumption that this third party guarantees part of the outstanding debt should the
sovereigndefault. Lenderscan thuspurchasesovereignbondsuptothislimit with-
out incurring default risk as only debt in excess of this limit is subject to the risk
of losses. This lowers the average interest rate on outstanding government debt
and increases the incentive to borrow excessively because ﬁnancing costs decrease.
In comparison to a situation without bailouts, if corresponding output shocks ex-
ist, the risk of a country defaulting rises. This is a very simpliﬁed description of
17bailouts, which are usually ad hoc measures and not initially integrated into the
system (see also Section 2.3). However, this could form the basis for integrating the
analysis into a more realistic environment and also for modelling the third (bailout)
party; for this, seealso Boz (2011) and Roch and Uhlig (2011), which we will discuss
in more detail below.
Arellano (2008) – whose working paper version of the article published in
the American Economic Review in 2008 can probably be viewed as the basis for the
other literature on this type of model (some of which is already discussed above)
– shows that the model is able to replicate (most) economic facts and the scenarios
that led to the crisis in Argentina rather well. Arellano (2008) illustrates another
important aspect of this type of model. Since lenders take default probabilities into
consideration,theinterestratetheyrequirerises, ceteris paribus, along withthelevel
of public debt. This creates an endogenous borrowing limit, which the sovereign
(voluntarily) does not exceed. In principle, the government would have an inter-
est in increasing its borrowing so as to raise the current level of consumption, and
would be able to do so (subject to rising interest rates). However, the additional
credit available on the market is comparatively expensive (the price at which the
sovereign can sell its bonds is low, hence the interest rate is high), meaning that ad-
ditionalcurrentconsumptioncan befundedonlythroughveryhighlossesinfuture
consumption (price and volume effects moving in the opposite direction). Conse-
quently, the government will not wish to borrow above the endogenousborrowing
limit; this is essentially a kind of “Laffer curve” effect.
In a modelwhere investorsadditionally obtain information on thefuture out-
put situation of an economy, Durdu et al (2010) show that sovereign defaults can
also occur in good times. This happens when investors view negative information
obtainedabout an economyas credible and thereforeraise theinterestrateson gov-
ernment bonds, which means that it is no longer worthwhile for the governmentto
service its debt. The information is modelled as a shock process that is correlated
with the output process. Since this correlation is imperfect, however, the informa-
tion obtained by investors does not necessarily reﬂect actual developments. Durdu
et al (2010) show that a corresponding calibration of the shock process for informa-
tion can be used to replicate spread developments in industrial countries.
4.2 Risk aversion and contagion
Arellano (2008) also shows that more realistic interest rate spreads can be gener-
ated within the model framework if risk-neutral international investors include a
stochasticdiscountfactor in theircalculations of thebondprice, ﬂexibly interpreted
assomewhatsimilar tostochasticnewsshocks. However,thiscould alsobe derived
18endogenously in the case of risk-averse investors. Lizarazo (2010) explicitly mod-
els these risk-averse investors using a framework that is otherwise largely based
on the model in Arellano (2008); as she illustrates, this allows realistic debt ratios
to be calibrated much more easily than in the standard model and her model can
better replicate the movements in yield spreads. In this framework, investors can
decide whether to invest in T-Bills (which are assumed to be risk free) or in risky
government bonds. The bond price (ie the interest rate that a sovereign has to pay
on its debt) now no longer dependssolely on the economy’s fundamentals but also
on the ﬁnancial wealth and risk aversion of the lender. This implies that the bond
price can now be broken down into two components: a base premium that com-
pensatesthe investorsfor the actual probability of default and the associated loss of
income, and an excess premium that compensates them for taking the risk of default
in the ﬁrst place. The wealthier the investors, or the lower their risk aversion, the
cheaper it is for a sovereign to borrow, because the excess premium, at least, falls.
Lizarazo (2009) explicitly integrates contagion of government crises from one
country to others based on the model in Lizarazo (2010). This is not possible in
Arellano’s (2008) base model, which replicates risk-neutral investors. If investors
are assumed to be risk-averse, however, it is. In Lizarazo (2009), it is assumed that
a (representative) risk-averse investor can purchase the bonds of several countries.
The wealth of the investor now depends on the country composition of his bond
portfolio and the respective default probabilities. If one of the countries defaults,
the investor’s wealth decreases. If he is risk-averse, this will reduce his willingness
to expose himself to other risky investments and, all other things being equal, he
will invest more heavily in riskless T-Bills. A country whose fundamentals are es-
sentially unchanged must now, ceteris paribus, pay a higher risk premium (excess
premium) as a result of the reduced wealth of the investor in order to convince him
topurchase its bonds. A sovereigndefault (or an elevatedrisk thereof)in one coun-
try thus diminishes other countries’ borrowing possibilities – even if the ﬁnancial
situation of these countries can essentially be regarded as secure/sound. Lizarazo
(2009) describesthis as the “income” effect. Higherfunding burdens in one country
can thus also increase other countries’ default probabilities. However, a substitu-
tion effect also occurs. The investor wishes to restructure his portfolio because of
the income effect. He can do this both via riskless (but relatively low-yield) T-Bills
and the (slightly higher-yield) government bonds of other countries whose ﬁnan-
cial situation he considers to be “sound enough”. Depending on his degree of risk
aversion, he will hence wish to shift his bond portfolio away from “unsound” and
towards “sound enough” countries, leading to a disproportionately sharp rise in
the ﬁnancing burdens of “unsound” countries. Their default probabilities then in-
19crease as a result of this additional burden.9 For countries with fundamentals that
are strong (or regarded as such by the investor), the restructuring of the portfolio
(ie the substitution effect) can then trigger a fall in their ﬁnancing burden, thus en-
hancing their borrowing possibilities. This effect could also be described as a ﬂight
to quality. Which of the effects actually occurs depends to a large extent on the pa-
rameters used in the model. It is not possible to formally derive reliable theoretical
relationships governing the threshold above which an investor considers a country
to be sound or how strongly this and the other results are affected by increased
risk aversion among investors (see also Lizarazo, 2010). In principle, however, it
can be assumed that the substitution effect (in addition to the income effect) has a
greater negative impact on a country’s ﬁnancial burdens the worse the country’s
fundamentals, the greater the investor’s risk aversion, the lower his wealth and
the more exposed his (existing) portfolio is to the “problem country” (which may
choose/chooses to default) and to other “unsound” countries. Simulations show
that the model can successfully replicate the contagion effects of the Argentine cri-
sis on Uruguay.
4.3 More complex ﬁscal policies
Cuadra et al (2010) integrate more complex production and ﬁscal sectors into their
model. They assume that households derive utility from private and public con-
sumption goods and, at the same time, make a consumption-leisure choice, and
that output is produced using labour. The state generates revenue by taxing con-
sumption, sets the level of government expenditure and (new) borrowing and de-
cides whether or not to default. This signiﬁcantly extends the sovereign’s room for
manoeuvre, and its decisions have more complex repercussions on the rest of the
economy. With respect to the default decision, bond prices and risk spreads, the
model can replicate the stylised facts just as well as the aforementioned models.
Additionally, ﬁscal policy can be shown to act procyclically in this kind of model
framework (ﬁscal agents raise expenditure and cut taxes in good times). This is, at
least for developing countries, a stylised fact, but it tends to be counterproductive
from the point of view of wealth and consumption smoothing. During recessions,
a government’s debt ﬁnancing conditions deteriorate owing to a higher risk of de-
fault and the associated rise in risk premiums. As households derive utility from
the provision of public goods, the government then increasingly ﬁnances this ex-
penditure via taxes, since debt ﬁnancing is now (relatively) more expensive. How-
9This is also due to the fact that – as described in the base model (Lizarazo, 2010) – the incentives
of a country with low output and/or a high level of debt to default rise more sharply than that of
a higher-output, lower-debt country because the utility function of the private sector is concave.
This behaviour is therefore rational from the investor’s point of view.
20ever, higher taxes reduce the consumption of private goods (which causes utility
losses) and lead, at the same time, to lower output. This is because higher taxes
also induce house-holds to reduce their supply of labour due to the consumption-
leisure choice (owing to the fact that the relative price ratio of consumption and
leisure must correspond to the ratio of the marginal utilities). To (partly) compen-
sate for the negative labour incentive, the government now reduces expenditure
during the recession, too, so that taxes do not have to be raised as sharply.
In a two-period model, Cuadra et al (2010) additionally investigate whether
the results change if it is assumed that the private sector – in this case households–
can likewise borrow on foreign credit markets and choose to default. When setting
the interest rate on government bonds, international investors now take account of
both public and private sector debt. The same applies to interest rates on private
debt instruments. The conclusions of the models in which only the sovereign can
become indebted are, it transpires, essentially conﬁrmed. However, the govern-
ment’s propensity to borrow can increase. If the economy is hit by a series of ad-
verse shocks, it becomes more difﬁcult for the sovereign to borrow because the de-
fault probability for the private sector (and thus the overall probability of default)
also rises. As outlined above, this increases the government’s incentive to raise
taxes. As the private sector can now, in principle, borrow abroad and can therefore
carry out consumption smoothing itself, this incentive is actually strengthened. On
the other hand, the private sector faces similar funding constraints as the govern-
ment (or even has to pay higher risk premiums), which means that, for the private
sector, borrowing is not necessarily the best instrument for smoothing consump-
tion. A government seeking to maximise household utility may be inclined to raise
taxes less sharply and take on more debt. The model’s simulations show that the
magnitude of the economic (utility) loss that a country faces following a default de-
pends on whether it is the private sector, the government or both that decide not to
fulﬁl the credit obligations. This initial – comparatively simple and rather stylised
– step towards integrating the interactions between private and public sector debt
into dynamic macro models could form the basis for more detailed analyses.
4.4 Negotiating to regain capital market access
Yue (2010) and D’Erasmo (2010) endogenise the probability of a country regaining
access to the capital markets following a default – something which had previously
been regarded as exogenous. They assume that a country explicitly negotiates its
re-entry into the capital markets and debt repayment. This takes the form of a
(one-shot) Nash bargaining game, in which it is assumed that the debtor and the
creditor negotiate how much of the outstanding debt is to be repaid. If this debt
21renegotiation fails, the creditor gets nothing and the country remains in permanent
autarky. It is only once the negotiated repayment has been made that the default-
ing country can regain access to the capital markets. These models thus combine
both elements: the inclusion of endogenous default probabilities (and thus also en-
dogenous risk premiums) and endogenous debt recovery rates. The models can be
shown to replicate the empirical facts of the other models while also being capable
of reﬂecting the observable haircuts.
The incorporation of endogenous debt recovery rates inﬂuences the
sovereign’s default decision ex ante, too. As in the other models, the default prob-
ability increases, ceteris paribus, with rising government debt. However, the debt
recovery rate following a default falls as debt rises.10 When setting the bond price,
creditors not only take the default probability into consideration but also form ex-
pectations regarding the debt recovery rate in the event of a default. The lower the
(expected) recovery rate, the lower the price they are willing to pay for purchasing
government bonds (ie the higher the required interest rates). The sovereign’s in-
centives to borrow are now inﬂuenced by two counterveiling effects. On the one
hand, the incentive to borrow rises because the government might regain access
to the capital markets in the event of a default comparatively cheaper subject to a
rather large haircut; on the other, it falls because this is taken into account by the
investors when purchasing government bonds. In the baseline calibration of the
model in Yue (2010), the former effect appears to be predominant, as it generates
higher government debt. The same applies to D’Erasmo (2010), who, by integrat-
ing a reputation effect into a very similar model, is able to generate even higher
debt ratios.
Thedelaysindebtrestructuringnegotiations(which, inthecaseofArgentina,
took as long as 40 months) found in empirical data are generally regarded as evi-
dence of inefﬁciencies (see also section 2.3). Nonetheless, building on the literature
discussedin thepreviousparagraphsand usinga modelin which governmentdebt
restructuringand theprobability of a governmentre-enteringtheinternational cap-
ital markets are also negotiated following a default, Bi (2008) shows that it can be
beneﬁcial for both the defaulting country and the debt holders to delay the nego-
tiations (ie “waiting” can be an efﬁcient equilibrium outcome). Based on Merlo
and Wilson’s (1995, 1998) bargaining game, in each negotiation period borrowers
or creditorsare randomly selectedtomake a proposal regarding thesize of the debt
recovery rate. If the selected player decides to make a proposal, the other player
10The higher the outstanding sovereign debt of a defaulting country, the greater the loss that cred-
itors, as a whole, will suffer in the event of a total default. As they negotiate repayment with
the defaulting sovereign, they accept a lower debt recovery rate when government debt is higher,
although the recovery amount itself increases with rising debt. Ultimately, this is a composition
effect resulting, among other things, from the Nash bargaining solution.
22can choose to accept it. The government then repays according to the agreement,
regains access to the capital markets, and the negative output effects in the country
“disappear”. In all other cases (ie the selected player passes or the other player
rejects the proposal), the game is repeated in the following period.11 Depending
on the volume of outstanding government debt and the output shock, it can be
beneﬁcial to both the defaulting country and the creditors to delay negotiations (ie
to reject or pass). For the same reason as in the Nash bargaining games described
above, the recovery rate falls when the debt-to-GDP ratio rises (ie, the higher the
ratio, the lower the recovery in relative terms); in addition, it is easier for the coun-
try to make a higher repayment in good times. Given a negative (temporary but
fairly long-lasting) output shock, it can be advantageous for both parties to wait
(the creditor can hold out for a larger repayment because the size of the “cake”
will increase; the defaulting country can lessen the relative costs of repayment be-
cause the utility losses incurred by foregoing consumption have less of an impact
in good times). Interestingly, the debt recovery rate is affected by the identity of
the proposer in the actual debt recovery period. If it is the defaulting country, debt
recovery is lower than when the creditor makes the proposal (which is accepted in
equilibrium). The debtor (creditor) will make a proposal that the creditor (debtor)
is just about willing to accept. Although the creditor (debtor) would like to receive
more (pay less), the expected probability of the player in question being able to
improve the offer appears too low.
In a comprehensive paper, Benjamin and Wright (2009) present a new
database covering 90 defaults by 73 countries that were settled in the period from
1989 to 2006 and containing extensive data on the relevant restructuring negotia-
tions (and their outcomes). They too embed the restructuring negotiations in the
type of sovereign default model discussed above. Structurally, the negotiations are
modelled in a similar way as in Bi (2008), ie one player is randomly selected in each
negotiationperiodtobetheproposer,whois allowedtomake anoffer thattheother
player can either accept or reject. Unlike in Bi (2008), however, the players do not
negotiate the debt recovery rate; instead, the selected player proposes a transfer of
resources from the debtor to the creditor. This transfer (also when accepted by the
creditor) can exceed the resources currently available to the debtor, requiring ex-
pected future income to be transferred as well. As this is not so simple to achieve,
such proposals involve the sovereign borrowing new funds, which must be pro-
vided by the creditor. There is therefore a risk that the debtor country will default
11Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) use a game with complete information. It can be shown that, for
this reason, a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium implies that a proposal is only submitted if
the other player accepts it. The formal solution is thus provided by the ﬁxed point of a system
of equations consisting of the relevant present value functions of propose/pass and accept/reject
and of the recovery rates (selected as a proposal) resulting from maximisation.
23on this new government debt in a future period. In this structure, the creditor has
two strategies: (1) he can demand a transfer and offer to lend (limited) new funds
or (2) he can demand full repayment of the government debt. The debtor country
can (1) repay the debt in full, (2) offer a transfer and request to borrow new funds
or (3) offer nothing (and remain in autarky). The other player can either accept or
reject whichever proposal is made. If the proposal is rejected, the next round of
bargaining begins. If a proposal is accepted, the debtor country is allowed to re-
access the capital markets. Creditors have an interest in maximising the payments
they receive, whereas the debtor country wants to keep them as low as possible. It
therefore tends to prefer the option of funding a transfer through new borrowing
over full repayment of the sovereign debt. Creditors, on the other hand, cannot be
entirely conﬁdent that the debtor country will not default on this new debt. It can
therefore be beneﬁcial for both parties to wait for better times, when the probability
of a default on the new debt falls and the (expected) payments to the creditor rise.
The model is able to replicate the stylised facts calculated by Benjamin and Wright
(2009) using the new database and explains why some debtor countries are more
highly indebted when they exit such negotiations than when they entered them.
Delaysin restructuringnegotiationscanthusrepresentan equilibrium which,
depending on the interpretation, may be efﬁcient because, in the underlying bar-
gaining structure, both parties may be able to minimise/maximise their future
loss/gain in utility. This is particularly true of Bi (2008), but such cases can also
occur in Benjamin and Wright (2009). Nonetheless, the models described above do
not take the coordination problems among creditors mentioned in section 2.3 into
account. The model in Pitchford and Wright (2010), for example, shows that when
creditors are uncoordinated the negotiations can be (inefﬁciently) delayed, as indi-
vidual investors hold out for better payoffs, or that individual investors free ride
on negotiation costs. Bai and Zhang (2010) show that the structure of sovereign
debt also plays a role. Before the 1990s, it was usually banks that acted as creditors,
which made creditorcoordination duringgovernmentdebtrestructuringcompara-
tively simple; since then, it has become much more difﬁcult to coordinate creditors
becausegovernmentsissuebondsthat can be tradedonthesecondarymarket. This
delays restructuring and the government’s re-entry into the capital markets. How-
ever, these studies often have more of a focus on game theory and tend to be more
concerned with restructuring negotiations than the macro modelling of sovereign
defaults; they are therefore not discussed in more detail in this article.
244.5 Debt maturity and debt dilution
All of the above-mentioned papers assume that sovereigns issue one-period bonds
that must be fully reﬁnanced in each period. In reality, however, governments gen-
erally issue bondswith different maturities and also incur long-termdebt. Building
on the framework in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005), which assumes a constant debt
level, Alfaro and Kanczuk (2007) integrate one and two-period bonds into their
model. A country which can issue only one-period maturity bonds is compared
with an otherwise identical country which can issue two-period maturity bonds.
As outlined in more detail above, in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005, 2007), investors
form expectations regarding the type of government (good or bad) they are con-
fronted with and set the interest rates accordingly. The likelihood of the govern-
ment type changing is mapped using a Markov chain. Information on the current
type of government is thus comparatively indicative of the government type in the
following period. However, uncertainty regarding the government type increases
for periods in the more distant future. If investors consider the current government
typeto be “good”, it is relatively likely that this will still be the case in the following
period. Nonetheless, the likelihood of this remaining so in later periods is lower.
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2007) use this argument regarding uncertainty to explain why
empirical data show that the interest rates paid on longer-term bonds are usually
higher than on short-term bonds. The opposite is true, however, if investors con-
sider the current government to be “bad”. Longer bond maturities lead to a fall in
the volume of sovereign debt to be reﬁnanced per period and (at least in bad times)
in the ﬁnancial burden of future sovereign debt due to the (opposite) uncertainty
argument just described. This leads, on the one hand, to a decline in the utility of
a government default; on the other, the costs of such a default also fall. The latter
can be explained by the fact that, in the model, the sovereign is not excluded from
the capital markets after a government default but instead faces “only” a higher
interest rate, and the rise in interest rates is smaller for long-term bonds than for
short-term ones because of the (opposite) uncertainty argument. It is impossible
to tell which of the two effects is predominant from a theoretical point of view.
For most of the calibrations in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2007), however, it is the latter,
meaning that the propensity to borrow increases when bonds have long maturities.
The simplifying assumption of a constant debt level given longer-term debt –
as in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2007) – is relaxed by Hatchondo and Martinez (2009),
who incorporate long-term debt and varying debt levels into Arellano’s (2008)
“baseline framework”. A logical starting point is the assumption that the repay-
ment of bonds issued in the current period (t) will mature in T periods. Since,
given endogenous new borrowing, new bonds can be issued in each period, how-
25ever, such an assumption means that the (debt) state space consists of the vector
(b0,b1,b2,...,bT−1),w h e r ebt denotesthe volume of debt that must be repaid in t pe-
riodsin thefuture. Becausethesolutionmethodtosolvethesemodelsisnon-linear,
the computational time and effort is immense (or even unfeasible) even for small
T values, as there are at least T state variables that can themselves take on many
different values. Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) therefore assume that the govern-
ment issues bonds that promise an inﬁnite stream of coupons which decreases at
a constant rate. Depending on this rate, the model can replicate one-period bonds.
This is the case if the rate is equal to one.12
In this model, the maturity structure of the outstanding bonds is exogenous
and constant, but the level of government debt is variable. It is only possible to
study the different effects that arise given different exogenously determined matu-
rities. If the sovereign declares a default, it (permanently) discontinues payment
of the concerned coupons to the investors, but can issue new coupons. Hatchondo
and Martinez (2009) then look at the differences that arise when one-period and
four-year bonds are issued. They, too, show that the interest rates on four-year
bonds are higher, ceteris paribus, than thoseon one-periodbonds. The argument is
similar to that of the uncertainty argument in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2007). In addi-
tion, the paper addressesthe fact that, unlike in the case of one-period bonds, hold-
ers of old debt face debt dilution. The longer the maturity, the less a government can
commit toservicing the debtin thefuture. Furthermore,newborrowing increases a
sovereign’s probability of default – even for already/still outstanding government
debt. These factors combined reduce the (expected) value of the government debt
for those who own old bonds, leading to debt dilution. The interest rate spread
therefore rises (even) more strongly than can be justiﬁed by the uncertainty argu-
ment alone. In good times, and given a low level of sovereign debt, governments
issuing one-period bonds within these models can borrow at almost the zero-proﬁt
price (ie at the risk-free rate). The longer the maturity of the bond, the less possible
this becomes. The welfare gains generatedthrough long-termdebt – resulting from
the lower debt rollover (and thus higher consumption) per period13 – are reduced
by this debt dilution argument. The model’s simulations show that, although one-
period bonds do not appear to be optimal from an ex ante welfare perspective, to
maximise welfare, the maturity of the bonds should be kept relatively short.
12This can also be interpreted as if the debt issued by the government consisted of a portfolio of
zero-couponbonds ofdifferentmaturities, where the portfolioweights decline geometricallywith
maturity. If the rate is equal to one, the entire weight is on the one-period bond.
13Relatively higher consumption in “bad times” results because the ﬁnancial burdens rise dispro-
portionately if debt is short-term. In good times, the generally higher interest rate on long-term
bonds can lead to a decline in consumption. Owing to falling marginal returns for consumption,
however, higher consumption in bad times – at least up to a certain threshold for the maturity of
the bonds – is the dominant concern from a wealth perspective.
26Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009) incorporate long-term bonds into their
model using a very similar approach. They assume that bonds with a certain ma-
turity can be issued in each period, but that unit bonds are inﬁnitesimally small.
These assumptions also prevent a disproportionately large rise in the state space,
since the authors are able to calculate a sort of law of motion for bonds and thus
still have only “one” (debt) state space. The qualitative results are similar to those
of Hatchondo and Martinez (2009).
As a thought experiment, Hatchondo et al (2011) extend the model in
Hatchondo and Martinez (2009). They assume the existence of a rule which re-
quires that the government receive the consent of existing bondholdersbefore issu-
ing (new) debt. This could be viewed as an expanded form of the collective action
clause. In order that the existing bondholders consent to the government issuing
debt, they must be compensated for the loss resulting from debt dilution (in the
model: through a transfer). This reduces the interest rate spread required by cred-
itors by lessening the possible future loss of income. While this is a very stylised
analysis, such techniques could have a role to play in the design of adequate stabil-
isation mechanisms – albeit, perhaps, in a different form.
4.6 Choosing the debt composition and where to borrow
Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2010) examine the question of governments’ pre-
ferred maturity structure when they have bonds with different maturities at their
disposal. Based on the model in Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), who compare the
impact of differing(exogenouslyassumed)maturities, theyendogenisethegovern-
ment’s decision regarding the maturity structure if it can issuedebt using (two) dif-
ferent bonds with different maturities. The government faces the following trade-
off: by issuing debt in the form of long-term bonds, it can hedge against (shorter-
term) ﬂuctuations in the bond price (and thus in the reﬁnancing costs) because (1) it
must roll over only part of the outstanding government debt in each period and (2)
the interest rate on the bonds is ﬁxed when they are issued. By issuing short-term
bonds, the government can, in a given period, obtain more liquidity at a cheaper
interest rate because it avoids the above-mentioned commitment and debt dilu-
tion involved in long-term debt. However, owing to the rapid debt rollover, the
ﬁnancing costs in the following period are higher (and the discounted utility loss
resulting from lower consumption in the near future falls). In good times (ie given
comparativelylowspreads),thegovernmentissuesmorelong-termbonds,sinceits
motives for hedging are more pressing. In bad times, it tends to issue more short-
term debt, as additional liquidity is so important in these periods that it outweighs
the near-term increase in ﬁnancing costs. This continues to hold – at least up to
27a certain threshold – even when the interest rates on short-term bonds rise more
sharply than those on long-term bonds owing to the increased short-term default
risk. Owing to the concave utility function, additional current consumption pro-
vides a strongerjustiﬁcation for future consumption lossesin such periods because
the marginal utility of each additional unit of consumption is relatively high. This
mechanism can (at least partly) explain why governments take on more short-term
debtin bad times (including shortlybefore a default)eventhoughthespreads(over
the risk-free yield) on short-term bonds rise more sharply than those on long-term
bonds.
Boz (2011) analyses governments’ decisions to borrow from private sector
creditors or international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). This borrowing takes the form of one-period bonds. Private sec-
tor lending is modelled, in principle, following the approach in Arellano (2008): the
interest rate is determined endogenously according to the expected default prob-
abilities. Loans from IFIs differ from private sector loans in three ways. First, IFI
loans are enforceable. The stated reason for this is effective monitoring and the
fact that the IFI has a preferred creditor status. Second, IFIs require an interest rate
calculated from the sum of the risk-free rate and a charge that increases with the
amount borrowed from the IFI. An IFI sets the interest rate purely on the basis of
the outstanding level of debt owed to it, as this is sure to be serviced. Third, loans
to a sovereign from an IFI are attached to conditionality arrangements regarding
budgetary discipline. This conditionality is approximated by assuming that the
sovereign has to switch to a higher discount factor (lower discount rate) when it is
indebted to an IFI. It is thus assumed that ﬁscal policy becomes more "patient" as
soon as it borrows from an IFI. In a sense, Boz (2011) thus endogenises the decision
of the governmenttobe a “good”or “bad” ﬁscal authority as deﬁnedby Alfaro and
Kanczu (2005), Hatchondo et al (2009) or D’Erasmo (2010). If the country decides
to borrow from an IFI, it decides to adopt a “good” ﬁscal policy (since future con-
sumption is valued more highly, budgetary policy automatically becomes “more
restrictive”, making a default less likely). The model is able to explain why bor-
rowing on commercial credit markets is procyclical, whereas IFI lending is coun-
tercyclical. In good times, sovereigns prefer to borrow commercially because the
low default probabilities keep the costs low. In bad times, ﬁnancing conditions on
commercial capital markets deteriorate. Unlike the private sector, which takes total
indebtedness into account, an IFI will set interest rates purely on the basis of the
debt owed to it; this makes it more worthwhile for a sovereign to borrow some of
the funds that it requires from an IFI when times are bad. In relative terms, IFI
lending becomes cheaper for the sovereign. From a theoretical perspective, it is
unclear what effects the possibility of borrowing from IFIs has on a country’s de-
28fault probability. On the one hand, it can be expected to rise given that this debt,
too, must be redeemed, reducing future consumption possibilities and increasing
the incentive to default outlined above. On the other, the incentive to default falls
because the sovereign becomes more “patient” and places a higher value on future
consumption (because the discount factor is assumed to rise). In simulations that
are calibrated to developing countries, the former effect appears dominant.
As the debate in the euro area shows, these issues are no longer relevant
solely to developing countries and this model allows room for expansions, eg in-
cluding the funding of such organisations. Going in this direction, a similar mod-
elling approach as in Boz (2011) is taken by Roch and Uhlig (2011) in their (still
quite preliminary) paper. They (want to) address contagion and assistance mecha-
nisms in a monetary union setting by merging the modelling approaches of Arel-
lano (2008) and Cole and Kehoe (2000); so far, however, their focus is still more on
the theoretical properties of the model and results are only preliminary.
5 Integration of the approaches into a RBC model
Tocompare presentvalue functionsintheabove-mentionedmodels–whichinform
the government’sdecision on whether to default – non-linear solution methodsare
needed; it is therefore difﬁcult or (in large models) impossible to incorporate these
decisions into the conventional (often larger) DSGE models used by many institu-
tions. Even where non-linear methods can be used, the speciﬁc solution method
applied plays a role – at least from a quantitative point of view. This is illustrated
by Hatchondo et al (2010) in a rather technical analysis. The most commonly used
solution method is the discrete state space technique (see section 3.2), although
this requires a large (predetermined) state space to be assumed in order to avoid
erroneousinterest rate movements. In simulations, however, this techniqueis com-
paratively inefﬁcient, time-intensive and – very importantly – prone to parametri-
sation. Other solution methods (such as Chebyshev polynomials or cubic splines)
seem less vulnerable to parametrisation or the choice of state space and, in some
cases, allow more rapid calculation. As the discussion of these aspects is very tech-
nical, readerswhowouldlike more detailedinformation shouldrefer toHatchondo
et (2010) and Zhu and Xie (2011).
Although it is difﬁcult to transfer the modelling of a government’s endoge-
nous decision to conventional DSGE models, it does appear necessary – particu-
larly in the current situation – to develop more complex default models so as to be
able to replicate relevant current and future issues (eg restructuring as compared
withan assumptionofjoint liability, adequacy of borrowing limits,...). In particular,
it would appear desirable to model the repercussions of a sovereign default on the
29domestic economy, which are, in most cases, built into the aforementioned models
as an exogenous decline in domestic output. Mendoza and Yue (2010) present a
model that can be viewed as an initial step in this direction. This model transcends
the separation between RBC models, in which default risk is assumed to be an ex-
ogenous process, and the sovereign default models described here, which assume
an exogenous output process. They combine the literature on “sudden stops” – in
which certain events can occur within a RBC model that lead to a sudden stop in
the external ﬁnancing possibilities of a country/sovereign – with the type of model
discussed above, in which the sovereign decides whether or not to default.14
In their model, Mendoza and Yue (2010) assume that ﬁrms producing ﬁnal
goods do so using working capital and labour. Working capital consists of a com-
bination of domestic and imported intermediate goods, which are imperfect sub-
stitutes. Imported intermediate goods must be paid for before production begins;
this is funded, at least in part, through (foreign) loans. In the event of a sovereign
default, it is assumed that the production sector also experiences ﬁnancing difﬁ-
culties on (ie loses access to) the capital markets, meaning that it can no longer
purchase imported intermediate goods. Although imported intermediate goods
can be replaced with domestic ones, they are imperfect substitutes, and this leads
to a loss in efﬁciency. Unlike in the literature discussed above, the default proba-
bility and the level of domestic productivity therefore interact. Lower productivity
affects default probability as in the aforementioned models (positively) and inﬂu-
ences ﬁnancing conditions (negatively, ie higher spreads, including for the private
sector). This, in turn, has negative repercussions for domestic productivity, (more
sharply) increasing the incentives for a sovereign default. Because the intermediate
products are modelled as Armington CES aggregators, the loss in output following
a government default in this model is an endogenous, sharply rising and convex
function of the productivity shock. Ultimately, this means that larger shocks have
a greater impact on the default probability than small shocks and that output dy-
namics and default risk are determined jointly in this model. All of the previously
discussedliterature eitherassumesthatproductivity shockshave symmetriceffects
on output (and thus, implicitly, quasi-symmetric effects on default probability) or
installs ad hoc asymmetries which are not explained endogenously to the model.
Mendoza and Yue’s (2010) model is thus able to capture the feedback effects
between default and output (losses) more explicitly. More speciﬁcally, it is able to
illustrate three stylised facts: (1) the V-shaped dynamics of output around default
14For more information on the basic structure of these models, see Mendoza (2010). Mendoza
(2006,2010) provides an overview of the ﬁndings of this literature. As these models essentially
fall into a different category, a detailed explanation of their workings would extend far beyond
the scope of this paper; readers interested in learning more should refer to the aforementioned
articles for an initial grounding in the subject.
30events, (2) the negative correlation between interest rates on sovereign debt and
output and (3) the disproportionately high government debt ratio when defaults
take place. Conventional RBC/DSGE models are usually unable to explain points
(1) and (3) given that sovereign defaults (if included at all) follow an exogenous
process,whereas most of the literature discussedin this article cannot explain point
(2) because the outputprocessis modelledexogenously. Mendozaand Yue(2010) is
therefore a promising approach to expanding such models so that they encompass
both approaches.
6 Conclusions
Discussions about sovereign defaults will probably take on new dimensions in the
courseofthecurrentcrisisandareunlikelytoremainrestrictedtodevelopingcoun-
tries. Expanding (theory-based) analytical tools such as RBC or DSGE models,
which are used in large (international) institutions to investigate economic rela-
tionships or simulate certain political measures, so that they can model sovereign
defaults would therefore be a welcome development. Formalising aspects such as
contagion effects, assumptions of joint liability, suitable insolvency legislation etc
could provide a useful contribution to the likely debate on these issues.
Sovereign default literature – whose ﬁndings should at least be acknowl-
edged in the current situation – came into being, above all, in response to govern-
ment crises in a number of Latin American countries. The modelling techniques
developed in this context could be helpful for reﬁning the models that have been
used until now.
Fromtheliteraturediscussedinthispaper,itcanbeconcludedthat(1) despite
the absence of international insolvency legislation, sovereigns have an interest in
repaying debt owing to reputational damage and negative output effects; (2) in the
event of transitory shocks, debt level is the key factor determining the probability
of default; in the event of trend shocks, the output level also plays a decisive role;
(3) the political stability of a country reduces its probability of default; (4) bailouts
or the possibility of borrowing from international ﬁnancial institutions such as, for
example, the IMF (can) increase the probability of default; (5) ﬁscal policy acts pro-
cyclically if it takes the probability of default and the impact on interest rates into
account; (6) taking private sector debt into account does not change the above-
mentioned qualitative statements but can increase a government’s propensity to
borrow (in relative terms); (7) endogenising negotiations about debt recovery rates
tendstoincrease theinterestratesonsovereigndebtbuta government’spropensity
to borrow can still rise; (8) it can be efﬁcient for borrowers and creditors to delay
negotiations over restructuring sovereign debt, although this is heavily dependent
31on the assumed bargaining game; (9) long-term bonds usually have a higher rate of
interest than short-term ones; (10) contagion effects owing to risk-averse investors
as well as information shocks affecting investors that impact on the interest rate
can even cause fundamentally sound governments to default; and (11) the formal
method of solving these models also plays a role in quantitative terms.
With respect to expanding the models used by large (international) institu-
tions to include the aspect of sovereign defaults and approaches from the litera-
ture described above, the work of Mendoza and Yue (2010), in particular, lends
itself to combining the RBC models with the default structure discussed in this
paper. If their model could be expanded to include a multi-country setup as in
Lizarazo (2009), this would doubtless produce interesting ﬁndings regarding con-
tagion effects or the design of a stabilisation mechanism. Incorporating an infor-
mation shock into such a model, as in Durdu et al (2010), could also make the
model easier to calibrate to the euro area. Financial markets then also look at
other information alongside economies’ fundamentals when setting interest rate
spreads. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show how bailouts can be integrated into
such systems,Hatchondo et al (2010) incorporate a (very stylised)type of collective
action clause, Boz (2011) allows for international ﬁnancing institutions (such as, for
example, the IMF) lending and aspects of debt restructuring can be analysed us-
ing the proposed modelling approaches in Bi (2008), Benjamin and Wright (2009),
D’Erasmo (2010) or Yue (2010). All in all, there should be a number of options for
expanding this type of model so that it can be applied to the issues currently being
debated in the euro area.
The extent to which all of this is actually feasible remains an open question,
however, because the necessary solution methods are complex. The main difﬁ-
culties are caused by the fact that the solution mechanisms used to date in DSGE
models are linearised approximations of mostly very complex models which can-
not really model a (voluntary) default. All in all, smaller models would probably
need to be developed initially in order to analyse speciﬁc issues. The integration
of nominal frictions, as is usual in DSGE models, could also cause complications.
Nonetheless, the author considers it worthwhile to pursue this course of action,
as the sovereign default literature provides an informed basis for incorporating
sovereign defaults into dynamic macro models.
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